November 14, 2011
“Engineered” Protection in the Middle East
by Andy Coughlin
On a recent project trip to Saudi Arabia – my first visit to the Kingdom – I noticed how peaceful and prosperous the country seemed when compared to many of its neighbors. In the wake of many terrorist incidents that rattled the country during the first half of the last decade Saudi security forces began an ambitious effort to disrupt the operations of terrorist cells in the country. The last several years have been relatively free from such incidents, and one would tend to think the threat has vanished.
Unfortunately, many businesses and government facilities seem to have relaxed their security efforts in the wake of the seemingly diminished risk environment. In my opinion, the result has been the implementation of disjointed security solutions that address certain vulnerabilities while leaving others unchecked. For instance, concerned about injuries resulting from the hazardous blowout of glass windows, many facilities use blast window film to minimize debris. If implemented correctly, this and other similar security products can help mitigate risk at a cost that is more affordable than custom design solutions. However, oftentimes these prescriptive protection solutions are blindly applied to a building without consideration of the big picture response to an explosive event. The narrow attention to glazing performance disregards the performance of the window support system and adjacent walls. Although, hazardous glass failure may be mitigated the response of the supporting system to an explosive event may still result in unacceptable levels of damage and injury.
Another example of the broken line of logic in the approach to protective design can be seen in typical operational security protocol. Most buildings use posted security guards, mounted CCTV cameras, controlled elevator access, and the like to monitor activity in and around a building. However, all this does little when unrestricted parking is allowed a sidewalk’s width from the building, when security guards seem to hardly notice who comes in and out, or when the locked door to the stairwell is propped open. Such vulnerabilities are common when the overall building security has not been designed to address the risk unique to a given facility.
Even when assets are heavily protected, vulnerabilities can still be exploited. Investigations into the attack by Al-Qaida on the Abqaiq oil processing facility on February 24, 2006 revealed many lingering vulnerabilities, making it appear that “luck” prevented the attack from disrupting production rather than the security measures1.
All these highlight the importance of “engineered” protection. Many building designers commonly mis-translate protection into visions of fortress-like structures. However, effective evaluation of likely threats, tactics, and capabilities of aggressors has the potential to introduce protection measures that can be integrated into the building design, match the considered risk, and complement each other. While we can thank the anti-terrorism efforts of the government for foiling many plots before attacks can occur, it remains vital for facilities to be smart about the protection they are employing.
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